Newsweek published an article which noted that Medvedev is a puppet in the hands of the bloody junta of KGB thieves, headed by Putin. Newsweek writes

  "Medvedev's two years in office have seen much talk of radical change, but only skin-deep reforms. That's because in real life, as in the cartoon, Putin still leads the dance. Putin is the senior partner in the relationship, the one who continues to address the boyish-looking Medvedev by the familiar ty, a Russian pronoun reserved for underlings (Medvedev uses the more respectful vy).

  The bottom line is that Medvedev remains a loyal member of the Putin team, and his role in it is clearly defined. The real power remains firmly in the hands of Putin and his circle of ex-KGB officers. Medvedev's reforms are actually strengthening the system created by Putin.

  Current Western analyses follow a longstanding tendency seeking to find a contest of liberals versus conservatives. The reality is that "liberals" led by Medvedev are not challenging the KGB (now FSB); they are at their service.

  Medvedev feels filial loyalty to Putin. One clear taboo is the extensive business interests of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, Putin's alma mater and the ultimate core of his power. Underpinning it all is the greatest taboo: the creation of any institution such as independent prosecutors, press, or political parties that could challenge or investigate these private empires.

  Since Medvedev announced his crusade, cases of police blackmail have increased. Medvedev's role, it seems, was to make the right noises and deflect public anger at the corrupt police and bureaucracy without actually changing the way the system works.

  For all Medvedev's talk, he is "careful not to break the spine of the machine" of bureaucratic and police power created by Putin.

  Turns out they're the very same people who helped tighten the reins under Putin, dismantling democracy and limiting free speech.

  Far from being challenges Putin, Medvedev's initiatives are all part of a clearly defined plan that was cooked up by the Putin team as long ago as 2005.

  As Vladimir Pligin, a deputy head of the Kremlin--created United Russia, puts it, "Medvedev is undertaking a democratization of our political system, but without, God forbid, letting our state grow weak."

  If Putin and his people are still so firmly in charge, however, it raises the question of why they need Medvedev at all.

  The answer seems to be that the Kremlin's old bargain with the Russian people-you give us political carte blanche, we'll make you rich (or at least comfortable)-has been threatened recently by the recession and the drop in oil prices. The purchasing power of the ruble has fallen by nearly a third since 2008, and the government now plans to scrap subsidies for utilities.

  Putin hope that creating the appearance of responsive government will keep voters happy.

  In foreign policy Russia still asserts its right to what Medvedev last year called "a privileged interest" in its near abroad, and is still wary of US influence in former Soviet republics.

  Top bureaucrats need Medvedev: to secure all the money they stole during a decade in power. Since Putin came to office in 2000, Russian officials are estimated to have skimmed some 0 billion to 0 billion a year from the economy, according Panfilova from Russian branch of Transparency International.

  To keep these ill-gotten assets safe, Russia's kleptocrats need to ensure that foreigners don't pry too deeply. "All the Kremlin's money is abroad, and [the KGB] realize they should make friends with the Americans in order to provide themselves and their money some security," says Panfilova. The best way to avoid scrutiny is to imitate reform process.

  Medvedev and Putin agree absolutely on one of the most basic issues: that they must at all costs prevent any outside challenge to the system. This thinking has produced both an unceasing spin campaign and Medvedev's public reform initiatives. The two Russians have evolved a sophisticated tandem act in which Medvedev presents himself as the smart young ideas man while Putin acts as the steady old hand who knocks heads together.

  Putin's strategists have taken careful note of Gorbachev's fatal mistake, which was to allow upstart democrats to discredit the ruling elite through the press and then unseat it at the ballot box. To avoid suffering a similar fate, the Kremlin has taken pains to exert firm control over the media and ensure that all real political power remains within the Kremlin's big tent.

  Putin's authoritarian system - is a carefully choreographed political dance that bears about as much resemblance to real democracy as Swan Lake has to a real wildlife reserve. But the important thing is that just as in the New Year's cartoon, all of Russia's leaders are dancing to the same tune".