The current global economic crisis brings the greatest threat for the authoritarian regimes of Russia and China, convinced the British newspaper "The Guardian".

According to columnist Robert Skidelsky, the stability of political systems in Western democracies is provided due to the fact that in case of apparent failures of the ruling party and the emergence of social unrest, the system offers the switch of power to the opposition, without dismantling of the basic principles which hold together the system itself. However in the countries where the regime is authoritarian in nature (and author included Russia and China into the list of such countries) such possibilities are basically not available.

Robert Skidelsky notes that in the event of serious economic problems the ruling elites in authoritarian countries will have to face the power of the people's dissatisfaction all by themselves. Author draws comparison between the current situation in Russia and the period of the dictatorship of Suharto in Indonesia and the rule of the Shah in Iran.

He draws attention to the fact that those regimes have also been seemingly unshakeable at the time when domestic economic growth has been provided, but were wiped out by the people after their economies started to fail. Similar events, according to author's opinion, are to be expected for Beijing and Moscow.

Here is what Robert Skidelsky wrote in his article published in The Guardian:

"If a social contract depends on rapid economic growth, what happens when that fails? Russia and China are about to find out", Robert Skidelsky writes in the article. "They'll know whom to blame". "Enrich yourselves," China's Deng Xiaoping told his fellow countrymen when he started dismantling Mao Zedong's failed socialist model.

In fact, elites everywhere have always lived by this injunction, and ordinary people have not minded very much, provided that the elites fulfill their part of the bargain: protect the country against its enemies and improve living conditions. It is this implied social contract that is now endangered by economic collapse.

Of course, compliance with the terms of the contract depends on the time and place.  In Europe, the XIX century of the rich was required to demonstrate modesty and moderation: It was not to show excessive luxury.  Wealthy people kept most of their income, because the savings is both a foundation for their own investments, and demonstrating compliance with the standards of public morality.  And when it comes to the creation of the welfare state, it was assumed that the rich will play the role of philanthropy.

Of course, the terms of the contract vary with place and time. In nineteenth-century Europe, the rich were expected to be frugal. Conspicuous consumption was eschewed. The wealthy were supposed to save much of their income, as saving was both a fund for investment and a moral virtue. And, in the days before the welfare state, the rich were also expected to be philanthropists.

In the opportunity culture of the United States, by contrast, conspicuous consumption was more tolerated. High spending was a mark of success: what Americans demanded of their rich was conspicuous enterprise.

Societies have also differed in how wealthy they allow their elites to become, and in their tolerance of the means by which wealth is acquired and used. One dividing line is between societies that tolerate self-enrichment through politics, and those that demand that the two spheres be kept separate.

In western countries, politicians and civil servants are expected to be relatively poor. In most of the rest of the world, a political career is regarded as a quasi-legitimate road to wealth. But the broad conclusion remains: wealth is conditional on services. When the services fail, the position of the wealthy is threatened.

The global economy's downturn increases countries' political risk to varying degrees, depending on the severity of the shock and the nature of the implied social contract. Political systems in which power is least controlled, and the abuse of wealth greatest, are most at risk. The more corrupt the system of capitalism, the more vulnerable it is to attack. The general problem is that all of today's versions of capitalism are more or less corrupt. "Enrich yourselves" is the clarion call of our era; and in that moral blind spot lies a great danger.

Despite efforts to give it precision, estimating political risk is not an exact science. It requires political theory, not econometrics. Forecasting models, based on "normal distributions" of risk over short slices of recent time, are notoriously incapable of capturing the real amount of risk in a political system.

One of the "safest" political systems of recent times was President Suharto's regime in Indonesia. Suharto came to power in 1966, establishing a quasi-military dictatorship and encouraging Indonesians to "enrich themselves".

Despite the depredations of his family, enough Indonesians did so over the next 30 years to make his rule seem exceptionally stable - until the east Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 sent the Indonesian economy into a tailspin, triggering violent riots that forced Suharto out.

Similarly, few regimes seemed more stable than that of the shah of Iran, another long-term ruler, who, having bankrupted his country, was forced to flee the fury of a mob in 1979.

The lesson is clear. Autocracies, which are much praised for their decisiveness, and for guaranteeing "law and order", are paper tigers. They appear immovable until the moment they are evicted by popular anger. In face of economic failure or military defeat, their emperors turn out to be naked.

In such situations, the great advantage of democracies is that they allow a change of rulers without a change of regime. Failure discredits only the party or coalition in power, not the entire political system. Popular anger is channeled to the ballot box. In such countries, there may be "New Deals", but no revolutions.

In estimating political risk today, analysts must pay particular attention to the character of the political system. Does it allow for an orderly transition? Is it competitive enough to prevent discredited leaders from clinging to power? Analysts must also pay attention to the nature of the implied social contract. Broadly speaking, the weakest contracts are those that allow wealth and power to be concentrated in the same few hands, while the strongest are built on significant dispersal of both.

Deepening economic recession is bound to catalyse political change. The western democracies will survive with only modest changes. But strongmen who rely on the secret police and a controlled media to maintain their rule will be quaking in their shoes. Even Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who built his power on populist anti-Americanism, must be praying for the success of Barack Obama's stimulus package to lift his falling oil revenues.

The big countries with the highest political risk are Russia and China. The legitimacy of their autocratic systems is almost entirely dependent on their success in delivering rapid economic growth. When growth falters, or goes into reverse, there is no one to blame but "the system".

Igor Yurgens, one of Russia's most creative political analysts, has been quick to draw the moral: "The social contract consisted of limiting civil rights in exchange for economic well-being. At the current moment, economic well-being is shrinking. Correspondingly, civil rights should expand. It's just simple logic."

The rulers in Moscow and Beijing would do well to heed this warning", the Guardian columnist Robert Skidelsky concludes.